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Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been the subject of a great deal of attention and controversy in recent years. Each GSE has: faced accounting scandals;
been criticized for not sufficiently targeting their activities toward low-and-moderate income communities and households; and had policymakers voice concerns that they posed a systemic risk to the global financial system.
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At the heart of these (and other) issues is the GSEs' incentive structure. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly traded financial institutions that were created by Acts of Congress in order to fulfill a public mission. These charter Acts imbue the two GSEs with important competitive advantages (most notably, implied public-sector support for 2 their obligations) and define the scope of their permissible activities. 3 Over time, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac became exceptionally large, profitable, and politically powerful.
Recently, however, Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's singular exposure to U.S.
residential mortgages -coupled with a thin capital base --resulted in both of these GSEs facing financial distress. U.S. housing markets became increasingly stressed through 2007 and resulted in severe disruption to mortgage markets. Secondary market liquidity for mortgages not backed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac almost entirely dried-up; and GSE-backed mortgages saw liquidity pressure as evidenced by unusually wide yield spreads. These developments resulted in a significant reduction in the availability and cost of mortgage credit for homeowners.
As a result of these developments, the federal government was compelled to intervene to stabilize both GSEs and mortgage markets more generally. On September 7, The remainder of this paper will proceed as follows. Section II provides some background information about Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Section III describes the sources of financial distress facing these two GSEs. Section IV outlines the steps taken by the federal government to stabilize these systemically important institutions and also presents some evidence relating to the effectiveness of these and other recent federal interventions into secondary mortgage markets. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section V. carrying lower interest rates than "jumbo mortgages" with principal amounts above the conforming loan limit. Several econometric studies estimated the effect of GSEs on conforming mortgage rates; typically finding the interest rate differential to be about 20-25 basis points with variation in the estimates depending on the empirical specification, data sample, and time period studied. The perceived implied federal guarantee also distorts the GSEs' risk-taking incentives in a way that may increase the probability of financial distress. (A similar situation is well-understood in the context of federally insured depository institutions.)
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The idea is that a federal guarantee induces debt holders to accept artificially low interest rates irrespective regardless of a GSE's true default risk. A GSE can then increase the riskiness of its activities -which promise high returns to equity holders if the risks turn out well -without needing to share those rewards with debt holders in the form of higher coupon rates on their debt. The GSEs' equity holders thus perceive a greater-than-normal benefit from risk-taking.
In order to maximize benefits to homebuyers and minimize taxpayer risk, the federal government imposes a two-part regulatory structure on Fannie Mae and Freddie 21 As discussed in Eisenbeis, Frame, and Wall (2007) , OFHEO supervised only two institutions making it prone to regulatory capture. The agency was also an independent arm of HUD, which is more focused on promoting housing than contending with GSE safety-and-soundness. OFHEO was also subject to Congress' annual appropriations process and sometimes fell victim to political meddling. With respect to supervisory tools, OFHEO lacked the authority both to adjust minimum capital standards and to resolve a failure of either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
System. 22 The establishment of the FHFA reflects an improvement in GSE safety-andsoundness supervision and regulation since the new regulator (among other things): (1) no longer requires Congressional approval for its budget, (2) has authority to set minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements, and (3) has receivership powers. repeat-sales indices differ -owing to coverage differences by geography, loan size, and loan quality -this national decline in house prices is unusual.
III. Sources of Financial
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House price declines resulted in a large number of borrowers having mortgage balances that exceeded the value of their homes --a condition often referred to as "negative equity". Economic theory and evidence suggest that negative equity is a necessary condition for mortgage default. 24 Borrowers may face income disruptions that temporarily limit their ability to pay and have neither sufficient savings nor home equity to cover monthly living expenses. Other borrowers may default after finding themselves 22 By doing so, the FHFA succeeds the OFHEO, HUD's GSE mission regulation, and the Federal Housing Finance Board.
Information about the S&P/Case-Shiller house price index can be found at: <http://www2.standardandpoors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.topic/indices_csmahp/0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0, 0,0,0,0.html>. Information about the OFHEO house price index can be found at: <www.ofheo.gov>. See Leventis (2007) for an analysis of the differences between the two indices. respectively. This combined $65.5 billion in equity stood against almost $1.7 trillion in combined assets (3.9 percent capital-to-assets ratio) and another $3.2 trillion in net offbalance sheet credit guarantees. One year later, the two GSEs had expanded to almost $1.8 trillion in combined assets and $3.7 trillion in combined net off-balance sheet credit Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's portfolio investment businesses also suffered from mark-to-market losses on mortgage-backed securities held either in trading accounts or as "available for sale". (Under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP, 25 According to Financial Accounting Statement (FAS) Number 157, "fair value" is the price that would be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date.
For the GSEs' fair value balance sheets, see: <http://www.fanniemae.com/media/pdf/newsreleases/q22008_release.pdf> (Page 17) and <http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/er/pdf/2008fin-tbls_080608.pdf> (Page 13).
13 securities classified as "hold-to-maturity" are not marked-to-market unless there is an "other than temporary impairment" to value.) This was caused by an unusual and unforeseen widening of the yield spread between Fannie Mae and Freddie Macguaranteed MBS and 10-year Treasuries. Figure 1 presents the current coupon spreads on 30-year fixed-rate mortgages (to 10-year Treasuries) for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between January 2007 and July 2008. The observed widening is believed to be primarily caused by the financial market turbulence, which led to a heightened demand for U.S.
Treasury obligations that was reflected by lower Treasury yields. However, the aforementioned credit problems at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also likely played a role by pushing-up required yields on the GSEs' MBS.
Mark-to-market losses also occurred in each GSEs' holdings of "private-label" mortgage securities backed by subprime and Alt-A mortgages. 
IV. Federal Intervention
According to former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson (2009) Mac's case fair value was actually negative. Second, both institutions were carrying 30 Morgan Stanley was hired by the Treasury to provide market analysis and financial expertise in connection with its authorities to invest in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (e.g., Solomon and Paletta, 2008) .
relatively large "tax deferred assets" to allow them to reduce future income taxes. These amounts were $20.6 billion for Fannie Mae and $18.4 billion for Freddie Mac. If Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were subject to the bank regulatory standard for tax-deferred assets -and in light of their extremely weak near-term earnings prospects --those assets would have been written-off and taken total book equity down to $20.6 billion (Fannie Mae) and -$5.5 billion (Freddie Mac). The reasoning for the imposition of the conservatorships was that both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were financially distressed and could not perform their public missions -that is, providing counter-cyclical support to mortgage markets and financing affordable housing. By becoming a conservator, the FHFA assumed the responsibilities 31 While acceptable under GAAP, bank regulators require institutions to write-off all but the lesser of: (1) the amount of tax deferred assets the institution expects to realize in the next 12 months; or (2) 10 percent of Tier 1 capital. For example, for state member banks, see: 12 C.F.R. 208 Appendix A, Section II(B)(4).
32 Morgenstern and Duhigg (2008) report that Morgan Stanley (working on behalf of the Treasury) concluded that both GSEs had overstated their financial condition by postponing various types of losses.
of the directors, officers, and shareholders of both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the purpose of conserving each GSEs' assets and to rehabilitate them into safe-and-sound condition. New CEOs were named to act as agents of the conservator.
Concurrent with the conservatorships, the Treasury entered into a senior preferred stock agreement with each GSE. 33 The purpose of the agreements is to ensure that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac maintain positive net worth going forward. If the regulator determines that either institution's liabilities exceed assets under GAAP, the Treasury will contribute cash capital equal to the difference in exchange for senior preferred stock.
Each of these agreements is of an indefinite term and for up to $100 billion. After its also show a positive market response to these announcements.
V. Conclusions
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play a central role in the U.S. residential mortgage finance system. As real estate prices fell and mortgage defaults and foreclosures mounted, the two highly leveraged GSEs became financially distressed. In response, Fannie Mae's and Freddie Mac's federal regulator placed both institutions into conservatorship and the U.S. Treasury entered into senior stock purchase agreements with each GSE and introduced new liquidity facilities aimed at supporting the institutions and mortgage markets more generally.
The federal intervention into Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has been successful insofar as it improved the confidence of creditors and stabilized residential mortgage markets. However, the current arrangement of government ownership and control over these two enormous financial institutions will likely be revisited by the Congress in the months ahead. Today's consensus appears to be that the previous public-private business model is inherently flawed and unstable. 
